SKILLEMALL.ai

CD cloud-share-downloader

网盘分享链接转存 - 完全自动化,发的链接就能下

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: SxLiuYu v3.0.0 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 120 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
71/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
55
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store skill-card.md:21
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    Mitigation: Provide credentials only through a scoped authentication flow, confirm the destination account and share visibility, and avoid raw session cookies unless operationally necessary. <br>

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-short description under 40 chars: too little signal for triggering
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "triggers"

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (cloud-share-downloader) differs from the folder (share-transfer-tool)
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 4 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 120 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 24: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -212 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 5 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 4 items
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 55.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is not clearly malicious, but it asks for cloud-drive session cookies and advertises automatic copying and re-sharing of files without enough user control or disclosure.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026