SKILLEMALL.ai

DB video-downloader-enhanced

Download videos and extract original post captions, audio transcripts, and metadata from video platform links. Use when the user provides Douyin, Bilibili, WeChat Channels, Xiaohongshu, or YouTube links and asks to save the original video, capture the post text/caption, transcribe the spoken in-video script/copy, archive source material, or prepare video material for downstream analysis or skill creation. Douyin is implemented with an H5 primary route and yt-dlp fallback; Bilibili, YouTube, and Xiaohongshu are implemented through yt-dlp; WeChat Channels is not implemented yet and should currently be handled via the WeChat mini program kg百宝箱.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: SyanChen7 v0.1.0 MIT-0 12 files body ≈ 2 874 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 35 h ago

Download videos and extract original post captions, audio transcripts, and metadata from video platform links.

As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerYouTubeMedia and videotype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
57/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
39
Quality 40%
85
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
70/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Tools and files w 18
60
Result and completion w 14
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store README.md:206
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    yt-dlp --cookies-from-browser chrome
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:217
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    3. **Chrome cookies yt-dlp** — last resort; requires local Chrome browser access.
Medium and low: 5
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/providers/bilibili.py:79
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    [yt_dlp, "--cookies-from-browser", "chrome", "--no-playlist", "--dump-single-json", url],
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/providers/douyin.py:263
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    [yt_dlp, "--cookies-from-browser", "chrome", "--no-playlist", "--dump-single-json", url],
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/providers/xiaohongshu.py:465
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "--cookies-from-browser", "chrome",
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/providers/youtube.py:80
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    + ["--cookies-from-browser", "chrome", "--dump-single-json", url],
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/providers/youtube.py:120
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    command.extend(["--cookies-from-browser", "chrome"])
    quoted

Files scanned: 11. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 85Steps. 85 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2874 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • -32 of 3 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 649: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 20 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 85 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill does what it says, but it can automatically use local Chrome browser cookies and a cloud transcription service in ways users should review before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 2 Aug 2026