SKILLEMALL.ai

BF openclaw-mobile-pair

一键生成 OpenClaw 手机控制中心连接码(自动读取本机 gateway token)

ClawHub Agent Skills author: szx19970521 v0.1.1 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 157 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process F 49/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: scripts/generate-mobile-pairing.ps1

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
66
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
49/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: scripts/generate-mobile-pairing.ps1
Tools and files w 18
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass SKILL.md:23
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File scripts/gene…ps1 -BffBaseUrl "<https://api.yourdomain.com/>" -CopyToClipboard

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: scripts/generate-mobile-pairing.ps1

Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: scripts/generate-mobile-pairing.ps1
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: scripts/generate-mobile-pairing.ps1
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Steps. 8 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 157 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 45: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 4 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 8 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 66.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is for pairing a phone app, but it relies on a missing PowerShell script that would automatically use a local gateway token and copy sensitive pairing data.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026