SKILLEMALL.ai

BC skills-coach

Explore capability boundaries of a target Skill, analyze optimization potential, generate an optimized version using Training-Free GRPO, and compile results into a structured report

ClawHub Agent Skills author: T1aNS1R v2.3.1 MIT-0 39 files · 1 script body ≈ 3 635 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 64/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

AnalyzerData and analyticsSoftware developmentInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
64/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key api_checker.py:27
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment

Files scanned: 19. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "trigger"

Process rating: all ten parameters 64/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Steps. 85 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3635 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • -214 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 181: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 22 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 85 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (18 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is a real skill-optimization tool, but it can run commands, install software, call external AI services, and automatically change or delete generated skill files with limited approval gates.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026