SKILLEMALL.ai

DC tahcia-console

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Tahcia v1.0.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 5 890 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

Tahcia controls your real Chrome via a Chrome extension + WebSocket session + Mac engine.

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureGitHubAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
54/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
30
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:492
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:496
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -X PUT -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" \

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5890 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5890 tokens
  • 85Steps. 102 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (54 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 57 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 102 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is a real-browser and macOS automation helper, but it asks for broad desktop control, local credential use, external screenshot analysis, and persistent self-editing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 25 Jul 2026