SKILLEMALL.ai

BD browser-use-agent

Browser-Use:把 LLM 变成网页操作员的异步 Python 库(Python 3.11+)。Agent 步循环采集 DOM + 截图 → LLM 一次调用产出 thinking / evaluation / next_goal / action[] → 经 CDP 执行。 Browser-Use: an async Python library (3.11+) that turns an LLM into a web operator. The Agent loop collects DOM + screenshot, makes one LLM call emitting thinking / evaluation / next_goal / action[], and executes via CDP. Built on cdp-use; no Playwright.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Tang Weigang v0.1.0 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 360 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 43/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerPlaywrightAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
43/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Instruction override
If you install

The text contains phrases like "ignore previous instructions" or "you are now…". That is an attempt to hijack the agent: it may break your rules, the system limits or company policy.

For the author

An honest skill does not need them: state the role and the rules directly without overriding other instructions. Otherwise catalog scanners and corporate filters will block the listing.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Instruction override en-ignore-previous references/seed.yaml:701
    Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions")
    action: If you override the system prompt, KEEP the syst…:71 sentence verbatim ('Only use indexes that are

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 7 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 360 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 397: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 8 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 7 items
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill needs Review because its browser-automation label conflicts with authoritative finance/ZVT instructions while also advertising high-impact browser actions like checkout, login, uploads, and persistent profiles.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026