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BC clash-verge-auto-switch

Use when the user wants Codex to speed test Clash Verge Rev or Mihomo proxies, auto-detect currently used Clash groups from the live controller, switch a selector group to the fastest working node, diagnose controller connectivity, or install a macOS launchd job with a user-chosen interval.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: tankeito v1.0.0 MIT-0 7 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 724 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

AnalyzerSoftware developmentInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
81/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
75
Quality 40%
91
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install_launch_agent.sh:76
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl bootstrap "gui/$(id -u)" "$PLIST_PATH"
Medium and low: 3
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/switch_fastest.py:75
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install_launch_agent.sh:16
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    PLIST_PATH="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/${LABEL}.plist"
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/uninstall_launch_agent.sh:5
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    PLIST_PATH="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/${LABEL}.plist"
    detectorcode literal

Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Steps. 15 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 724 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 291: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 7 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill does what it claims: tests local Clash/Mihomo proxy nodes, switches selector groups, and optionally installs a user-level macOS schedule for that same task.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026