SKILLEMALL.ai

DD mail-mate

(no description)

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: tankeito v1.0.0 MIT-0 8 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 220 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
41/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
69
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
41/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 10

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence setup_cron.sh:76
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    ( crontab -l 2>/dev/null || true ) | grep -v -F "$TAG" > "$TMP" || true
Medium and low: 9
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence README.md:239
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition)
    crontab -l | grep -v imap-mail-pipeline | crontab -   # 移除本 Skill 的任务
    detector
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url pusher.py:114
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    webhook_url 格式:https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/sendMessage
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url README.md:179
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    | Telegram | `tg` | `https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/sendMessage` | 目标 `chat_id` |
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:214
    Reads a .env file (detector / deny-list definition)
    - cron 触发时自动 `source .env`,再执行 `python3 main.py`,stdout/stderr 追加到指定日志文件。
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention README.md:238
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -l                                            # 查看所有任务
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention README.md:239
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -l | grep -v imap-mail-pipeline | crontab -   # 移除本 Skill 的任务
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention setup_cron.sh:76
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    ( crontab -l 2>/dev/null || true ) | grep -v -F "$TAG" > "$TMP" || true
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention setup_cron.sh:84
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "可用 'crontab -l' 查看,用 'crontab -e' 手动编辑。"
    code literal
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url skill.md:194
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    | Telegram | `tg` | `https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/sendMessage` | 目标 `chat_id` |
    placeholder

Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 22 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2220 tokens
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -217 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 24 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
  • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill does what it says: it reads filtered IMAP email, extracts fields, and can optionally push results or run on a schedule, but users must handle mailbox credentials and pushed email content carefully.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026