SKILLEMALL.ai

AC redreplier-mean-marketer

A background accountability loop that surfaces fresh, high-scoring RedReplier lead opportunities and — if you ignored the last one (didn't approve or reject it) — roasts you, hilariously and meanly, about your marketing until you act. All criteria and the roast itself are computed server-side by RedReplier; this skill just loops and relays. Use when the user wants automated lead nudges, a "marketing accountability" or "roast me into marketing" loop, or to be pinged about new high-relevance Reddit/HN/X/Bluesky leads above a configurable score. Requires a RedReplier account + API key.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Taras Shynkarenko v1.0.2 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 2 119 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

A background accountability loop that surfaces fresh, high-scoring RedReplier lead opportunities and — if you ignored the last one (didn't approve or reject…

As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
95/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
90
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
57/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:79
      Mentions editing / listing crontab (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      secret stays in one `600` file instead of being copied into `crontab -l` output, process
      quoted

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "permissions"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 85Steps. 11 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2119 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low The skill ranks results itself: that belongs to the system behind the tool, not the model

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 2 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 589: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 11 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 11 items
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 90.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill mostly matches its marketing-nudge purpose, but it under-declares a status-changing RedReplier API action while also relying on a stored API token and scheduled background polling.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 31 Aug 2026