SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

BC gas-war-sniper-teneo

Real-time multi-chain gas monitoring and spike detection. Monitors block-by-block gas prices, detects sudden spikes, identifies gas war culprits, and alerts when significant price increases occur. Sup

ClawHub Agent Skills author: teneoprotocoldev v1.0.3 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 2 157 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

AnalyzerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
86
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:20
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      Risk: The release security summary says the skill can automatically spend USDC using a wallet private key without clear confirmation or spending limits. <br>
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:21
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      Mitigation: Use a dedicated wallet with minimal funds, avoid using a primary wallet private key, and require manual price review and confirmation before any paid call or direct payment command. <br>
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:74
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
      | Base | `eip155:8453` | `0x83…913` |
      table
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:75
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
      | Peaq | `eip155:3338` | `0xbb…d10` |
      table
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:76
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
      | Avalanche | `eip1…114` | `0xB9…a6E` |
      table
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:101
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      paymentAsset: "0x83…913", // USDC on Base
      quoted

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (gas-war-sniper-teneo) differs from the folder (teneo-agent-gas-war-sniper)
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 8 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2157 tokens
    • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 200: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 25 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 8 items
    • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is for paid AI-service calls, but it can automatically spend USDC using a wallet private key without clear confirmation or spending limits.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · 28 May 2026