CF termix-agent-skills
Use this skill for Termix Platform (dev-v2) operations — agent inspection, A2A runtime auto-reply for Provider Agents via OpenClaw inbox polling, order / brief / campaign reads, and dispute checks. Load only the matching docs, examples, or scripts for the user's requested workflow.
As a process F 37/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: examples/*.md, scripts/*.mjs
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.
Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 7
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 7
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsdocs/client-create-job.md:7Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target**Requires:** Agent NFT (`clientId`), MockUSDC balance, wallet private key
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsdocs/client-set-provider.md:7Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target**Requires:** Client wallet private key (must be NFT owner of the clientId on this job)
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsdocs/provider-submit.md:7Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target**Requires:** Provider wallet private key (owner of assigned Provider Agent NFT)
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsdocs/register-provider.md:10Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target**Requires:** wallet private key with BNB for gas + MockUSDC balance
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medium Exfiltration
net-redirectable-api-keyscripts/a2a-runtime.mjs:44Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another serverAPI key + configurable base URL from environment
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsSKILL.md:45Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target1. **Ask for the wallet private key.** Explain it is used locally only to sign
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokendocs/register-agent.md:63High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)-H "Authorization: Bearer Hrns…Nen" \
quoted
Files scanned: 44. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
missing-refreference to a missing file: examples/*.md - warning
missing-refreference to a missing file: scripts/*.mjs
Process rating: all ten parameters 37/100
- 0Tools and files. 2 referenced file(s) missing: examples/*.md, scripts/*.mjs
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 100Steps. 16 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2598 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low The response is described with custom markup (13 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -31 of 10 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 282: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 9 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (27 of 27)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.