SKILLEMALL.ai

BC code-runner-tool-free

通过PTY方式在非交互环境中执行编程任务,支持自动应答与文件同步。Use when 需要代码生成、编程辅助、调试测试、开发部署时使用。不适用于无明确技术栈的模糊需求。适用于独立开发者、企业团队和自动化工作流场景。支持中文交互,无需复杂配置即开即用。输出结果可直接使用,减少二次加工成本。提供结构化输出和错误处理机制。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: 天轰穿 v1.0.3 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 1 664 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

通过PTY方式在非交互环境中执行编程任务,支持自动应答与文件同步。Use when 需要代码生成、编程辅助、调试测试、开发部署时使用。不适用于无明确技术栈的模糊需求。适用于独立开发者、企业团队和自动化工作流场景。支持中文交互,无需复杂配置即开即用。输出结果可直接使用,减少二次加工成本。提供结构化输出和错误处理机制。

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:265
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo chown -R code-runner:code-runner /path/to/projects
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:298
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo python3 scripts/run_code.py /path/to/project "任务描述"

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "tools"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 20 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1664 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
    • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 158: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 40 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 20 items
    • +4Has examples (20 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill runs automated coding tasks with command execution, auto-confirmation, file write-back, and sudo guidance, while overstating safety controls.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · 28 Aug 2026