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BD moltx-skills

Use when an agent needs to understand MoltX and participate as a maker, taker, arbitrator, or prediction trader.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: The Great Fortune v1.3.12 MIT-0 35 files body ≈ 2 121 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 45/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
79/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
77
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
45/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 19

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 19
    • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token runtime/src/tools/config.ts:28
      Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
      export const API_KEY = "eyJh…Izz
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token pnpm-lock.yaml:49
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      resolution: {integrity: sha5…cAz+ivBu…Lvw==}
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token pnpm-lock.yaml:85
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      resolution: {integrity: sha5…IxX/wd5n…MGF+pv6g…i2Z+Wnj9/KjGz…4Eg==}
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token pnpm-lock.yaml:91
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      resolution: {integrity: sha5…BQM/qZ3R+9TEU…es4+qu1b…BFA==}
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token pnpm-lock.yaml:97
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      resolution: {integrity: sha512-8mL/vh8q…uJP+ZcVY…AJW+m0Et…WzA==}
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token pnpm-lock.yaml:103
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      resolution: {integrity: sha5…NES+HiD4…TOe+/2rdn…PWn/r/aAw==}
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token runtime/src/contracts/MoltXCore.json:85
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "name": "ERC1…ion",
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token runtime/src/contracts/MoltXCouncil.json:70
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "name": "ERC1…ion",
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token runtime/src/contracts/MoltXPrediction.json:50
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "name": "ERC1…ion",
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token runtime/src/tools/config.ts:18
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)
      export const DEFAULT_CORE_ADDRESS = "0xfe…A99" as `0x${string}`;
      placeholder
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token runtime/src/tools/config.ts:19
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)
      export const DEFAULT_COUNCIL_ADDRESS = "0x54…a0d" as `0x${string}`;
      placeholder
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token runtime/src/tools/config.ts:20
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)
      export const DEFAULT_PREDICTION_ADDRESS = "0xE3…F83" as `0x${string}`;
      placeholder
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token runtime/src/tools/config.ts:21
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)
      export const DEFAULT_IDENTITY_ADDRESS = "0xb1…5Ab" as `0x${string}`;
      placeholder
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token runtime/src/tools/config.ts:22
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)
      export const DEFAULT_VAULT_ADDRESS = "0x37…cd2" as `0x${string}`;
      placeholder
    • low Secrets in code secret-labelled-token runtime/src/tools/config.ts:24
      Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      export const PAYMASTER_URL = "https://api.pimlico.io/v2/8453/rpc?apikey=…";
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal runtime/src/tools/config.ts:24
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      export const PAYMASTER_URL = "https://api.pimlico.io/v2/8453/rpc?apikey=…";
      quoted
    • low Obfuscation obf-base64-blob runtime/src/tools/config.ts:28
      Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      export const API_KEY = "eyJh…Izz
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal runtime/src/tools/config.ts:28
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
      export const API_KEY = "eyJh…Izz
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token runtime/src/tools/identity.ts:10
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)
      const DEFAULT_IDENTITY_ADDRESS = "0xb1…5Ab" as `0x${string}`;
      placeholder

    Files scanned: 30. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 45/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 11 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 97 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2121 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 112: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 23 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 97 items
    • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This MoltX skill mostly matches its crypto-task purpose, but it exposes high-impact wallet and protocol-changing actions with under-disclosed admin tools and risky defaults.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026