SKILLEMALL.ai

FC vnstock-env-setup

Comprehensive environment diagnostic, setup, and agent guide installation for the Vnstock ecosystem (Free or Sponsored). Validates OS, Python, venv, and performs migrations. Fully English documented.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: thinh-vu v1.0.0 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 1 982 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

AnalyzerSoftware developmentAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
F
29/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
60/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-install-from-url SKILL.md:108
    Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archive
    pip install -r https://vnstocks.com/files/requirements.txt
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-install-from-url SKILL.md:115
    Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archive
    pip install -r https://vnstocks.com/files/requirements.txt
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:129
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    wget -qO- https://vnstocks.com/files/vnstock-cli-installer.run | bash -s -- --non-interactive --api-key "USER_API_KEY" --accept
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:132
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL https://vnstocks.com/files/vnstock-cli-installer.run | bash -s -- --non-interactive --api-key "USER_API_KEY" --accept
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-install-from-url SKILL.md:135
    Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archive
    pip install --extra-index-url https://vnstocks.com/api/simple vnstock_installer
Medium and low: 3
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-install-from-url SKILL.md:30
    Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archive (documentation table row)
    | **4. Install Dependencies**| `pip install -r https://vnstocks.com/files/requirements.txt` |
    table
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:32
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation table row)
    | **6. Sponsor Tier Setup** | **Linux**: `wget -qO- https://vnstocks.com/files/vnstock-cli-installer.run \| bash -s -- --non-interactive --api-key "API_KEY"`<br>**Mac**: `curl -fsSL https://vnstocks.c
    table
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-install-from-url SKILL.md:32
    Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archive (documentation table row)
    | **6. Sponsor Tier Setup** | **Linux**: `wget -qO- https://vnstocks.com/files/vnstock-cli-installer.run \| bash -s -- --non-interactive --api-key "API_KEY"`<br>**Mac**: `curl -fsSL https://vnstocks.c
    table

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 14 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 10 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1982 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -212 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 199: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 18 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This Vnstock setup skill is not clearly malicious, but it can run high-impact installers and persistently overwrite project and agent-guidance files.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026