CC link42-api
Use authorized LINK42 models for text, images, video, vision inputs and embeddings; upload owned assets, estimate cost and recover asynchronous tasks. Use for LINK42 API work, not account administration or unsupported model features.
Use authorized LINK42 models for text, images, video, vision inputs and embeddings; upload owned assets, estimate cost and recover asynchronous tasks.
As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.
Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
-
high Concealment
en-hide-from-userreferences/tool-integration.md:21Instruction to hide actions from the userInternational/domestic distribution changes download routing only, never the selected model/account, API credentials, currency or scope. A ClawHub/SkillHub command is advertised only after the exact p
Medium and low: 1
-
medium Exfiltration
net-redirectable-api-keyscripts/link42_agent.py:170Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another serverAPI key + configurable base URL from environment
Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 10 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1474 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +4No input/output examples
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 233: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 4 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 10 items
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.