BB agenta-monero
Use when making or receiving Monero (XMR) payments. Generates addresses, sends payments, checks balances, verifies transactions, generates and verifies payment proofs, estimates fees, sweeps funds, and manages wallet operations via a self-hosted monero-wallet-rpc node. Keywords: monero, xmr, cryptocurrency, payments, wallet, send, receive, payment proof.
Generates addresses, sends payments, checks balances, verifies transactions, generates and verifies payment proofs, estimates fees, sweeps funds, and manages…
As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain invisible characters, encoded commands or comments hidden from readers but visible to the model. What you read differs from what the agent sees.
Remove invisible characters (they usually sneak in through copy-paste) and encoded strings: no catalog will pass them. Instructions for the model must be readable by a human too.
How to improve
- For Hermes the description must be one sentence under 60 characters; move the conditions to a "When to Use" section.
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 8
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 8
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medium Obfuscation
obf-base64-blobREADME.md:154Long base64-looking blob82fP…2gR
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityAgenta-Monero Security Review.md:232Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Privilege Escalation
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityAgenta-Monero Security Review.md:252Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Privilege Escalation
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityAgenta-Monero Security Review.md:272Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Privilege Escalation
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvdocs/GETTING_STARTED.md:200Reads a .env filecp .env.example .env
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvREADME.md:65Reads a .env filecp .env.example .env
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvreferences/error-runbook.md:20Reads a .env file (negated — the text forbids it)| `CONFIG_INVALID` | `.env` contains invalid syntax or shell metacharacters | No | Inspect `.env` for metacharacters or malformed lines; fix and retry. Never `source .env` — it is parsed safely by des
negated -
low Exfiltration
read-dotenvsetup.sh:41Reads a .env file (quoted — discussed, not commanded)warn ".env not found at $ENV_FILE (copy .env.example and fill it in)"
quoted
Files scanned: 31. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-long-hermesdescription is 356 chars; the Hermes authoring standard requires ≤ 60 (one sentence, ending with a period) - warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 5021 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Consistency. The Hermes dialect needs category and tags
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5021 tokens
- 100Steps. 56 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 356: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 15 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 56 items
- +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 4)
- +3All 17 scripts are documented
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.