AC bridgic-browser
Use for any task requiring a real browser: viewing web pages, accessing login-gated sites, operating web UIs, scraping social media (Xiaohongshu/Weibo/Twitter/X, etc.), reading JS-rendered or dynamic pages, bypassing bot detection, form filling, e2e checks, and general web automation. Prefer this over WebFetch whenever the page needs JS execution, authenticated session, interaction, or stealth. Invoke via terminal CLI (`bridgic-browser ...`) or Python SDK (`from bridgic.browser.session import Browser`, `from bridgic.browser.tools import BrowserToolSetBuilder`). Also covers accessibility snapshot refs, CLI-SDK mapping/migration, and generating SDK code from CLI action steps.
As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-execpolicy-bypassscripts/install-deps.sh:209Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassedpowershell -ExecutionPolicy ByPass -c "irm https://astral.sh/uv/install.ps1 | iex" \
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-hostscripts/install-deps.sh:213Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh \
Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 70Failures and branches. 6 branches
- 85Steps. 25 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1365 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 682: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 7 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 25 items
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 5)
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.