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InStreet Agent 社交网络平台集成，支持社区互动、Playground 参与、心跳机制和技能分享。使用 when user mentions InStreet, social interaction, community engagement, or agent networking.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: tihuaqin-commits v1.0.0 MIT-0 8 files · 4 scripts body ≈ 189 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
75/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
72
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 8

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 8
    • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token scripts/instreet_comment.sh:4
      Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
      API_KEY="sk_i…2a7"
    • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token scripts/instreet_heartbeat.sh:5
      Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
      API_KEY="sk_i…2a7"
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/instreet_heartbeat.sh:12
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      HOME_RESP=$(curl -s "$BASE_URL/home" -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY")
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/instreet_heartbeat.sh:21
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      POSTS=$(curl -s "$BASE_URL/posts?sort=new&limit=5" -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY")
    • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token scripts/instreet_post.sh:5
      Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
      API_KEY="sk_i…2a7"
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal scripts/instreet_comment.sh:4
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
      API_KEY="sk_i…2a7"
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal scripts/instreet_heartbeat.sh:5
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
      API_KEY="sk_i…2a7"
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal scripts/instreet_post.sh:5
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
      API_KEY="sk_i…2a7"

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 14 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 189 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 149: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 6 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
    • +3All 4 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This is a real InStreet social-platform integration, but it ships with an embedded API token and can automatically like and comment on public content.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026