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CD xhs-catch

小红书笔记采集工具。当用户需要从小红书按关键词搜索并批量采集笔记数据时，使用此 skill。 触发关键词：采集小红书、抓小红书、小红书搜索、小红书笔记、小红书数据、小红书竞品、小红书调研、小红书内容、小红书痛点、小红书用户反馈。 功能：基于 WebBridge 控制浏览器，采集笔记标题、正文、作者、点赞/收藏/评论数、图片 URL、一级评论。输出 JSON 原始数据 + HTML 可视化报告。可同步到「好痛 Howtone」做进一步分析。

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: timqin-m v1.0.6 MIT-0 10 files body ≈ 1 073 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
69/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
67
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
41/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:35
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL https://cdn.kimi.com/webbridge/install.sh | bash
Medium and low: 7
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/webbridge-crawl.ts:81
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    execSync('curl -fsSL https://cdn.kimi.com/webbridge/install.sh | bash', { stdio: 'inherit' });
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/webbridge-crawl.ts:89
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed)
    console.error('   curl -fsSL https://cdn.kimi.com/webbridge/install.sh | bash');
    code literal
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:75
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…b8W+/HyIP…2x3+U9Qb…Q1g==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:99
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…xCA+ORZv…wO5/ywWF…Tag==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:117
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…YJg+xp+LPXV…GQe/ylDS…Jxg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:126
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…GD3+82K6JgJlm/Y+KI92…no5+4jh9sw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:150
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…MfZ+71RA…HvA==",
    detector

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (xhs-catch) differs from the folder (zion-xhs-catch-skill)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 26 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1073 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -214 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 223: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 18 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
  • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
  • +3All 5 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is a disclosed Xiaohongshu scraping tool, but it needs Review because it can auto-install browser-control software, store session and sync credentials in plaintext, and upload collected data to an external service using broad credentials.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 1 Jun 2026