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FB anvx

Track and optimize AI API spending across 19 providers with live pricing and 6 optimization modules.

Blockedguard blocked the skill: signs of malicious behaviour
ClawHub Agent Skills author: tje8x v1.4.6 MIT-0 57 files body ≈ 2 675 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process B 71/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
34/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
10
Quality 40%
69
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
71/100
Nearly there
When it triggers w 12
20
Tools and files w 18
60
Result and completion w 14
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
Guard blocked this skill: critical findings below. Do not install it until the author fixes them.

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Secrets in code
If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

  1. Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

  • critical Secrets in code secret-anthropic-key engine/utils.py:26
    Anthropic API key (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "anthropic": ["sk-a…345", "sk-ant-test-demo"],
    quoted
Medium and low: 4
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token engine/connectors/crypto_wallet.py:41
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "ethereum": "0xA0…B48",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token engine/connectors/crypto_wallet.py:42
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "base": "0x83…913",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token engine/connectors/crypto_wallet.py:43
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "arbitrum": "0xaf…831",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token engine/connectors/crypto_wallet.py:44
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "polygon": "0x3c…359",
    quoted

Files scanned: 57. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 71/100

  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 70Failures and branches. 5 branches
  • 100Steps. 74 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2675 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 100: 120–800 characters recommended
  • -31 of 6 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 22 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 74 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is mostly read-only and finance-focused, but it asks for very sensitive financial credentials and data while several data-flow and storage details are under-disclosed or inconsistent.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026