BC skill-security-audit
This skill should be used when evaluating the security of a ClawHub skill before installation. It performs comprehensive security risk assessment on skill directories, detecting prompt injection, malicious scripts, supply chain attacks, credential theft, and other threats commonly found in the ClawHub/OpenClaw ecosystem. Trigger this skill when a user wants to audit, review, or assess the safety of a skill downloaded from ClawHub.
As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, consistency
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The text contains phrases like "ignore previous instructions" or "you are now…". That is an attempt to hijack the agent: it may break your rules, the system limits or company policy.
An honest skill does not need them: state the role and the rules directly without overriding other instructions. Otherwise catalog scanners and corporate filters will block the listing.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 8
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 8
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellreferences/threat_knowledge_base.md:40Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill)- 是否存在远程代码执行模式（curl | bash、wget | sh）
security skill -
medium Instruction override
en-ignore-previousSKILL.md:71Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions") (documentation of a security skill)- Override or ignore safety guidelines
security skill
A further 6 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (skill-security-audit) differs from the folder (skill-security-check)
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 41 steps
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1718 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 434: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 12 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 41 items
- +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.