BC security-auditor-tk
Run security audits on Linux servers, web applications, and cloud infrastructure. Checks SSH hardening, firewall rules, open ports, SSL/TLS config, file permissions, and common vulnerabilities. Produces actionable reports.
As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches
AnalyzerInfrastructureData and analyticsSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- For Hermes the description must be one sentence under 60 characters; move the conditions to a "When to Use" section.
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
-
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/common-fixes.md:46Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)sudo cp /etc/fail2ban/jail.conf /etc/fail2ban/jail.local
security skill -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-background-processreferences/common-fixes.md:48Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)sudo systemctl enable fail2ban
security skill
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-long-hermesdescription is 222 chars; the Hermes authoring standard requires ≤ 60 (one sentence, ending with a period) - warning
description-no-whenneither description nor a "## When to Use" section says when to use the skill
Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 100Steps. 47 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 812 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 222: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 14 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 47 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.
External checks
ClawHub: suspicious
This is a coherent security-auditing skill, but it promotes copy-paste system hardening commands that can lock users out or disrupt services without enough safety guidance.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026