BF docker-claude-code-setup
Guide for setting up Claude Code in Docker containers with ttyd web terminal, tmux session persistence, acpx multi-agent tool, and API configuration. Use when: (1) Installing Claude Code in Docker/OpenClaw environments, (2) Setting up web-accessible terminal with ttyd, (3) Configuring persistent sessions with tmux, (4) Installing acpx for multi-agent workflows, (5) Configuring API keys for different providers. 在 Docker 容器中部署 Claude Code 的完整指南,包括 ttyd Web 终端、tmux 会话持久化、acpx 多代理工具和 API 配置。适用场景:(1) 在 Docker/OpenClaw 环境安装 Claude Code,(2) 配置 ttyd Web 终端,(3) 使用 tmux 保持会话持久化,(4) 安装 acpx 实现多代理工作流,(5) 配置不同 API 提供商的密钥。
As a process F 28/100 · Will not run — weak spots: steps, result and completion, when it triggers
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-hostreferences/claude-code-installation.md:15Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_20.x | bash -
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-hostscripts/install-acpx.sh:10Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_20.x | bash -
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-hostSKILL.md:21Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_20.x | bash -
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 28/100
- 0Steps. Prose only: no discrete steps
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1271 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3No numbered steps or checklist
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 617: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 11 headings
- +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)
- +3All 2 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.