SKILLEMALL.ai

DC chat-history

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Tonyfenwick1982 v1.1.1 MIT-0 20 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 929 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
44/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
73
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 15

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 15
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic main.py:100
    Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input
    os.system(f"crontab {temp_file}")
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic main.py:125
    Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input
    os.system(f"crontab {temp_file}")
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic main.py:184
    Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input
    os.system(f"crontab {temp_file}")
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention DELIVERY.md:361
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -l
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention DELIVERY.md:364
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -e
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention DELIVERY.md:448
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -l
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention main.py:58
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    result = os.popen("crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep chat-history").read()
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention main.py:83
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    existing = os.popen("crontab -l 2>/dev/null").read()
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention main.py:110
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    existing = os.popen("crontab -l 2>/dev/null").read()
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention main.py:165
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    existing = os.popen("crontab -l 2>/dev/null").read()
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SECURITY-NOTICE-v3.md:22
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | 检查任务 | `os.popen("crontab -l")` | `openclaw cron list` |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SECURITY-NOTICE-v3.md:111
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation of a security skill)
    # crontab -l | grep -v chat-history | crontab -
    security skill

A further 3 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 20. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 29 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1929 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
  • -223 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 46 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 29 items
  • +4Has examples (54 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is a local chat archiver, but it persistently indexes sensitive conversation history and its documentation understates the privacy and scheduling impact.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026