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BB parallel-ai-search

Use Parallel's parallel-cli to do live web search, URL extraction (clean markdown), deep research reports, bulk data enrichment (CSV/JSON), FindAll entity discovery, and web monitoring. Use when the user asks to look something up online, needs current sources/citations, provides URLs to read or summarise, requests deep/exhaustive research, wants to enrich a dataset with web-sourced fields, wants a list of entities (companies/people/places), or wants to monitor the web for changes over time.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Tristan Manchester v1.0.3 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 1 966 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 74/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationData and analyticsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
91
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
74/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Result and completion w 14
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/troubleshooting.md:9
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -fsSL https://parallel.ai/install.sh | bash
      vendor-host
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash(curl:*)
      allowed-tools: Bash(parallel-cli:*) Bash(curl:*) Bash(pipx:*) Read
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:58
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -fsSL https://parallel.ai/install.sh | bash
      vendor-host

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 74/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Failures and branches. 14 branches
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 50 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1966 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 495: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 22 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 50 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill’s main purpose is coherent, but it tells agents to install a dependency by running an unverified internet script directly in the shell.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026