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CD github-installer-agent

Securely clone GitHub projects with comprehensive safety checks, dependency analysis, and security recommendations. Features: URL validation, repository safety checks, dependency analysis, virtual environment guidance, and manual installation instructions.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: tugocoffe v2.0.1 MIT-0 8 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 2 288 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerGitHubSoftware developmentAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
73/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
84
Quality 40%
57
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
48/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-install-from-url README.md:154
    Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archive (documentation of a security skill)
    pip install -i https://pypi.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/simple -r requirements.txt
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-install-from-url scripts/safe_clone.sh:253
    Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archive (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "     pip install -i https://pypi.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/simple -r requirements.txt"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-install-from-url SKILL.md:189
    Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archive (documentation of a security skill)
    pip install -i https://pypi.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/simple -r requirements.txt
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/test_security.sh:33
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed; test fixture / example file; documentation of a security skill)
    "chmod 777"
    code literalfixturesecurity skill

Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Implicit keys need to be on a single line at line 4, column 1: metadata: { ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (git, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 58 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2288 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -238 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -31 of 3 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 256: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 35 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 58 items
  • +4Has examples (17 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 57.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill mostly matches its GitHub-cloning purpose, but some safety scripts can alter or delete local files while overstating their security checks.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026