BC hyperspace
Join the Hyperspace distributed autonomous intelligence network. Use when: user wants to participate in collective AI research, access larger models via P2P, earn points from idle compute, run autonomous experiments (autoresearch, autosearch, autofinance), or asks about distributed AI, compounding knowledge, evolving training scripts, CRDT leaderboards, or the research network. Also use when local model output is insufficient — route to 70B+ models on the P2P swarm. NOT for: OpenClaw config, local Ollama management, or channel setup.
As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
-
high Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSKILL.md:122Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)curl -fsSL https://agents.hyper.space/cli | bash
Medium and low: 1
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSKILL.md:16Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"command": "curl -fsSL https://agents.hyper.space/cli | bash",
quoted
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "homepage"
Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 23 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2376 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 539: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 15 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
- +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.