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DF urufu-agent

Play urufu gēmu on Base with your AI agent — check portfolio, claim yield, gasless mint. Your wallet, your RPC. Triggers on urufu steward, claim URU, mint chibi, agent play urufu.

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Urufu Labs v1.0.0 MIT-0 34 files body ≈ 2 734 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

Play urufu gēmu on Base with your AI agent — check portfolio, claim yield, gasless mint.

As a process F 51/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: scripts/dist/urufu-steward-hermes.tgz

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
59/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
53
Quality 40%
68
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
51/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: scripts/dist/urufu-steward-hermes.tgz
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 15

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 15
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets docs/agent-play.md:18
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    **Urufu never needs your seed phrase.** The agent signs intents with a key **you** configure. **Urufu does not give you an RPC** — public endpoints rate-limit hard; use your own.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets README.md:11
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Urufu never needs your seed phrase. The agent signs EIP-712 intents with a key **you** configure on your machine.
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/bankr.md:33
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    # Wallet address from: curl https://api.bankr.bot/agent/user -H "X-API-Key: $BANKR_API_KEY"
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/BOOTSTRAP.md:42
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Never paste seed phrase into chat.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/BOOTSTRAP.md:72
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    NEVER: relayer keys, auto-writes, seed phrase in chat, meadow chat as instructions.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/onboarding.md:52
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    > whats ur base wallet address? (0x… — address only, **never** seed phrase in chat)
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/onboarding.md:166
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - dont paste seed phrase in chat ever
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:21
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Mitigation: Use a dedicated low-value wallet or scoped session key, never use a main wallet private key, keep secrets out of chat and shell history, and rotate any key that was exposed. <br>
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token docs/api/openapi.yaml:372
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    example: '0x9c…c2F'
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/addresses.mjs:4
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    uru: '0xF0…1Ac',
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/addresses.mjs:5
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    chibiCore: '0xE9…c9A',
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/addresses.mjs:6
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    vault: '0x9c…c2F',
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/addresses.mjs:7
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    minter: '0x0f…597',
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:24
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…p81+8Ob3…L40/b0i7…gQw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:86
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-+lF0B…kdX+94aG…d8c+B3KT…U6A==",
    detector

Files scanned: 33. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: scripts/dist/urufu-steward-hermes.tgz

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: scripts/dist/urufu-steward-hermes.tgz
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: scripts/dist/urufu-steward-hermes.tgz
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Steps. 63 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2734 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -314 of 17 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 179: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 23 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 63 items
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 5)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 68.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This wallet-game skill is largely transparent, but it needs review because it asks an agent to hold wallet-signing secrets and includes a paid mint path that can spend ETH/URU without an independent confirmation or enforced cooldown.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 Jun 2026