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BB stateroot

Install and set up StateRoot, the continuity layer for AI coding agents. Switch harnesses. Keep the agent: personality, plans, tools and skills, memories, learnings, and project context carry across Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Kimi Code, OpenClaw, and other supported harnesses. Use this bootstrap skill when the user asks to install or set up StateRoot, when `stateroot` is missing from PATH, or when setup has not run. After setup, follow the built-in StateRoot skill for resume, checkpoint, handoff, memory, and daily workflow.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Usama Arshad v1.1.2 MIT-0 7 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 082 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

Install and set up StateRoot, the continuity layer for AI coding agents.

As a process B 66/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureGitHubSoftware developmentAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
79/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
75
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
66/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/disclosure.md:40
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - Ask before `curl … \| sh` or `irm … \| iex`.
      quoted
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host references/install.md:11
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl -sSfL https://github.com/CognizTech/stateroot/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host references/install.md:35
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl -sSfL https://github.com/CognizTech/stateroot/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:106
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl -sSfL https://github.com/CognizTech/stateroot/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:122
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl -sSfL https://github.com/CognizTech/stateroot/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh

    Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 66/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 85Steps. 25 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2082 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -5TODO / placeholder text left in the skill
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 530: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 9 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 25 items
    • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill has a coherent install purpose, but it uses remote script execution and persistent AI-agent hook installation while its manifest understates those durable changes.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · 11 Sept 2026