SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

AC cloud-security-posture

Cross-cloud security posture assessment covering IAM analysis, encryption audit, and public exposure detection across AWS, Azure, and GCP using [AWS]/[Azure]/[GCP] inline labels for provider-specific commands.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Vahagn Madatyan v1.0.0 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 4 675 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

AnalyzerGoogle CloudAWSAzureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
89
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:60
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      policies, missing authentication controls, and privilege escalation
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:73
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      gaps that allow privilege escalation paths (e.g., `iam:CreateRole` +
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:237
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      or admin-level privilege escalation. High: unencrypted sensitive
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:299
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ├─ Data exposure or privilege escalation path? → High
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:305
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      │  ├─ No boundary? → Critical — unbounded privilege escalation

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4675 tokens
    • 100Steps. 17 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 209: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
    • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This is a legitimate cloud security audit skill, but it should be reviewed because it overstates read-only safety while asking for broad cloud access and handling sensitive IAM data.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026