SKILLEMALL.ai

BB bumble

Bumble session, auth, matches, messages, sending, and profile-photo export via Remote Browser Service. Use to resume an existing Bumble app session, inspect state, list matches, fetch/send messages, unmatch, export profile photos, or re-authenticate only when Bumble is on get-started/auth pages.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Vasilii Vazhesov v1.0.6 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 1 628 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 66/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
66/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/rbs_client.py:27
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment
    • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SECURITY.md:32
      Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation of a security skill)
      - Session cookies stored by the Remote Browser Service for the operator's own
      security skill

    Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 66/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 8 mutating operations with no state check
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 85Steps. 51 steps, 2 vague phrases
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Failures and branches. 5 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1628 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 296: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 10 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 51 items
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill is mostly disclosed Bumble automation, but it automatically changes account location and can perform sensitive account actions with limited confirmation safeguards.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026