SKILLEMALL.ai

AC humanizer-academic

Rewrite AI-generated SERIOUS NONFICTION (EN/ZH) to read human, inventing nothing, in mode `academic` or `popsci`; ABSTAIN-FIRST — leaves it unchanged if it already reads human. Use for AI-looking academic/serious-popsci prose, or "$humanizer-academic". NOT for casual chit-chat, poetry/fiction, or inventing facts.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: VincentJiang06 v4.0.0 MIT-0 12 files body ≈ 2 213 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, failures and branches, running it twice

GeneratorResearchtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
95/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
94
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Read Write Edit Grep Glob Bash Task AskUserQuestion

    Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 18 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2213 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4No input/output examples
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 314: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (6 of 6)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 94.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This skill is a disclosed academic/popsci prose rewriting workflow with a local diagnostic detector, not evidence of hidden or harmful behavior.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 14 Jul 2026