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CF aioz-storage

Deploy static websites to AIOZ Storage with built-in templates or custom sites.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: vinhbui3004 v1.0.1 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 3 282 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process F 46/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: assets/main.js, assets/js/config.js, assets/style.css

TemplateInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
74/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
57
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
46/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: assets/main.js, assets/js/config.js, assets/style.css
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 1 more place: ClawHub

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 7
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:150
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    2. **12-word seed phrase** — BIP39 passphrase from bucket creation
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:245
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    | `--passphrase` | Yes | 12-word seed phrase |
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:69
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…xCA+ORZv…wO5/ywWF…Tag==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:101
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…GD3+82K6JgJlm/Y+KI92…no5+4jh9sw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:127
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…MfZ+71RA…HvA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:140
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…Kxf+MSr9…jrj/FHl8…mYA+ftRkP/3oKQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:147
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…TPG/KSnE…ao6+eXF3…fAT+nCNwQ==",
    detector

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: assets/main.js
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: assets/js/config.js
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: assets/style.css
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: assets/images/

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: assets/main.js, assets/js/config.js, assets/style.css
  • 0Tools and files. 4 referenced file(s) missing: assets/main.js, assets/js/config.js, assets/style.css
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 8 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (aioz-storage) differs from the folder (aioz-storage-skill)
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 74 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3282 tokens
  • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 79: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 25 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 74 items
  • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 57.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This AIOZ website deployment skill is coherent, but it handles account passwords, seed phrases, and long-lived storage grants in under-contained ways.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026