SKILLEMALL.ai
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CC castreader

URL to audio: extract any web page and convert to natural AI speech (Kokoro TTS). The only skill that turns a URL into a podcast-quality MP3 — no API key needed. Also reads synced books from WeChat Reading / Kindle library aloud. Triggers: read this article, listen to webpage, URL to audio, text-to-speech, read aloud, web page reader, article to podcast, read a book chapter.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: vinxu v3.2.14 MIT-0 10 files body ≈ 1 254 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationWriting and documentsMedia and videoInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
74/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
80
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 8
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/generate-text.js:16
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/read-url.js:29
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/sync-books.js:38
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:78
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…bKX+KS9G…yMA/NhKJ…RGz/Q==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:139
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…Wwy+ghLE…vfU/YnxW…fdg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:260
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…2BV+FY5ZFezP/ypmwayk68+NzzA…NFD/uUmBJuGoXw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:302
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…vZS+VIDU…jX4+qx9M…saQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:391
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…GLw+xYSd…cqA==",
    detector

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 6 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1254 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • -31 of 4 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 377: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 16 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 6 items
  • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
CastReader does what it advertises, but users should review it because it can upload article and local book text to a remote TTS service and has weak scoping around URLs, local library access, and command templates.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026