SKILLEMALL.ai

BD ecto

Ghost.io Admin API CLI for managing blog posts, pages, tags, and content.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: visionik v0.1.0 29 files body ≈ 706 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 40/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationWriting and documentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
69
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
40/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal internal/config/config_test.go:154
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (test fixture / example file)
    APIKey: "key1…456",
    fixture
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal internal/config/config_test.go:461
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (test fixture / example file)
    APIKey: "conf…233",
    fixture
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal internal/config/config_test.go:472
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (test fixture / example file)
    "default": {Name: "default", URL: "https://default.ghost.io", APIKey: "d:73…233"},
    fixture
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal internal/config/config_test.go:473
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (test fixture / example file)
    "envsite": {Name: "envsite", URL: "https://envsite.ghost.io", APIKey: "e:73…233"},
    fixture
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal internal/config/config_test.go:748
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (test fixture / example file)
    "mysite": {Name: "mysite", URL: "https://my.ghost.io", APIKey: "m:01…def"},
    fixture

Files scanned: 29. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 40/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 75Steps. 3 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 706 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 73: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 3 items
  • +4Has examples (12 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This Ghost admin CLI is mostly coherent, but it gives an agent broad live-site authority and stores admin credentials without enough warning or scoping.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 10 Sept 2026