SKILLEMALL.ai

BF volcengine-sale

Use when the user asks to purchase, subscribe, provision, open, or place an order for any Volcengine commercial product, or uses Chinese verbs such as "开通 / 购买 / 下单 / 买 / 售卖 / 想买 / 订购" together with a Volcengine product name. Trigger even when the user does not mention "sale" but expresses a clear provisioning intent.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: sdk-team v1.0.1 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 360 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

Use when the user asks to purchase, subscribe, provision, open, or place an order for any Volcengine commercial product, or uses Chinese verbs such as "开通 /…

As a process F 41/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: references/<product>.md

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
41/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: references/<product>.md
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash Read Write

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: references/<product>.md

Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: references/<product>.md
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: references/<product>.md
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Steps. 15 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 360 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 319: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 6 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill is a disclosed Volcengine purchasing helper that requires user confirmation before paid CLI actions and does not show hidden data collection or destructive behavior.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 27 Aug 2026