SKILLEMALL.ai

BC byted-voice-to-text

语音转文字(ASR)。使用火山引擎 BigModel ASR 识别语音,包含极速版(≤2h/100MB 同步快速返回)和标准版(≤5h 异步识别)两种模式。支持飞书语音消息、本地音频文件及音频 URL。当收到语音消息或音频附件(.ogg/.mp3/.wav)时使用本技能。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: volcengine-skills v1.0.0 MIT-0 9 files body ≈ 1 128 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
74
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/api_key.py:105
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment

Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 27 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1128 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (7 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -31 of 5 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 136: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 16 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 27 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill performs the advertised cloud voice transcription, but it also has under-disclosed system-install and API-key management behaviors that need review before use.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026