FD forex-skill
(no description)
As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
- Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 12
-
critical Secrets in code
secret-openrouter-keyagents/main/agent/auth-profiles.json:7OpenRouter API key (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"key": "sk-o…e4a"
quoted -
critical Secrets in code
secret-telegram-botopenclaw.json:109Telegram bot token (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"botToken": "8762…AHx…"
quoted
Medium and low: 10
-
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyidentity/device.json:5Private key material (key header without key body; quoted — discussed, not commanded)"privateKeyPem": "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …\n",
header onlyquoted -
medium Secrets in code
secret-google-keyopenclaw.json:80Google API key (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"apiKey": "AIza…4DY"
quoted -
medium Broad scope
meta-agent-memory-dumpworkspace/HEARTBEAT.mdAgent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (6) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokensworkspace/HEARTBEAT.md, workspace/IDENTITY.md, workspace/memory/2026-05-05.md, workspace/MEMORY.md, workspace/SOUL.md
-
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokendevices/paired.json:4High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"publicKey": "FJiI…j98",
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokendevices/paired.json:28High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"token": "qm4h…mTk",
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokendevices/paired.json:46High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"publicKey": "5vq4…UPQ",
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokendevices/paired.json:72High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"token": "3Ua7…TqM",
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenexec-approvals.json:5High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"token": "MnX6…dXq"
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenidentity/device-auth.json:6High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"token": "3Ua7…TqM",
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenopenclaw.json:80High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"apiKey": "AIza…4DY"
quoted
Files scanned: 73. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
frontmatterSKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found - error
name-missingSKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name` - error
description-missingSKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 4 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 250 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +4No input/output examples
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 5 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 4 items
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.