BB testagent-browser-setup
One-time installation and initialization of Chromium, system dependencies, Chinese fonts, and the CDP launcher script in a fresh openclaw environment — no root required. Triggered when the user says "initialize test environment", "install browser tools", "setup browser", or when deploying a test agent to a new machine for the first time.
One-time installation and initialization of Chromium, system dependencies, Chinese fonts, and the CDP launcher script in a fresh openclaw environment — no…
As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
-
high Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellscripts/setup-optional.sh:6Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)curl -fsSL --retry 3 https://browser-use.com/cli/install.sh | bash || {
Medium and low: 1
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellscripts/setup-optional.sh:8Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed)echo " curl -fsSL https://browser-use.com/cli/install.sh | bash"
code literal
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 75Steps. 3 steps
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 632 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 3 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 339: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 8 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 3 items
- +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
- +3All 2 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 90.