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BF felo-superAgent

Felo SuperAgent API: AI conversation with real-time SSE streaming on a persistent LiveDoc canvas. Use when users want SuperAgent chat, continuous conversation, logo/branding design, or e-commerce product images. Do NOT use for tweet/X post writing — use felo-twitter-writer instead. Explicit commands: /felo-superAgent.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: wangzhiming v1.0.2 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 9 385 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process F 51/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: url

IntegrationInfrastructureMarketingDesigntype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
51/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: url
Tools and files w 18
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/run_style_library.mjs:152
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/run_superagent.mjs:413
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:104
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo 'export FELO_API_KEY="your-api-key-here"' >> ~/.zshrc

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 9385 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: url

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: url
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: url
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 23 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 9385 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 85Steps. 133 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 19 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (10 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +3Description length 319: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 34 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 133 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (47 code blocks)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is a coherent Felo API integration, but it should be reviewed because it can send prior conversation context and persistent workspace identifiers to Felo with broad reuse rules.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026