DC thinking-frameworks
(no description)
Not recommendedlow grade D
As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches
How to improve
- Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 13
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 13
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityPROMOTION.md:101Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)• Red Team - Adversarially attack your own plans
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityPROMOTION.md:130Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)First Principles, Red Team, Premortem, Bayesian, etc.) for OpenClaw
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityREADME.md:61Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"Red team this plan for me: [plan]"
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/red-team.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Red Team Thinking
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/red-team.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)**Red teaming** is the practice of deliberately attacking your own plans, ideas, products, or arguments to find vulnerabilities before reality does. Originating in military war games (where a "red tea
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/red-team.md:7Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)You are now the **Red Team**. Your mission: relentlessly attack the following plan, idea, argument, or system. Find every crack, exploit every weakness, expose every blind spot.
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/red-team.md:98Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## Phase 6: Red Team Report
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/red-team.md:119Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)The red team's job is to be the loyal opposition — tough, honest, and constructive. Breaking the plan in a war game is infinitely cheaper than reality breaking it in production. A plan that survives a
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityskill-card.md:14Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)External users and developers use this skill to guide an agent through named thinking frameworks such as critical thinking, first principles, red team analysis, premortems, Bayesian thinking, and syst
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityskill-card.md:40Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [Red Team Thinking](references/red-team.md) <br>
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:10Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)- Explicitly requests a thinking mode (e.g., "use critical thinking", "first principles analysis", "red team this")
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:32Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| red-team | red team, adversarial, attack plan | Finding weaknesses through adversarial analysis |
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:52Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"Red team this plan for me: [plan]"
quoted
Files scanned: 24. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
frontmatterSKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found - error
name-missingSKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name` - error
description-missingSKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 50When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 12 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1001 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -420 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 8 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
- +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.
External checks
ClawHub: clean
This is a markdown-only reasoning framework skill with no code execution, data access, persistence, or hidden behavior.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026