SKILLEMALL.ai

AB install-stack-flagos

Install the 5-package multi-chip software stack (vLLM, FlagTree, FlagGems, FlagCX, vllm-plugin-FL) inside a GPU container. Handles network mirror detection, dependency ordering, wheel selection, and per-package validation. Use after gpu-container-setup has produced a running container with PyTorch + GPU access.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Flagos v1.0.0 MIT-0 8 files body ≈ 1 661 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 71/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, progress reporting

AnalyzerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
90
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
71/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash(*)
      allowed-tools: Bash(*) Read Edit Write Glob Grep WebSearch WebFetch AskUserQuestion
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:195
      Writes to a shell startup file (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      docker exec <CONTAINER> bash -c "echo 'export FLAGCX_PATH=/tmp/FlagCX' >> ~/.bashrc"
      quoted

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "user-invokable"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 71/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 5 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1661 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 312: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 18 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 5 items
    • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
    • +3All 4 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 90.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This skill is a disclosed GPU-container installer, but it will materially change the target container and should be used only where that is acceptable.
    LLM: benign (high) · 28 May 2026