SKILLEMALL.ai

AA perf-test-flagos

Run accuracy benchmarks (FlagEval, when available) and performance benchmarks (vllm bench serve) against a served model. Covers 5 workload profiles: short/long prefill x short/long decode + high concurrency. Collects throughput, latency, TTFT, TPOT metrics.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Flagos v1.0.0 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 1 244 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process A 80/100 · Runs to the end — weak spots: when it triggers, progress reporting

ReferenceData and analyticsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
91
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
A
80/100
Runs to the end
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Result and completion w 14
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash(*)
      allowed-tools: Bash(*) Read Edit Write Glob Grep WebSearch WebFetch AskUserQuestion

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "user-invokable"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 80/100

    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 12 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1244 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 257: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 13 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
    • +3All 2 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill does what it says, but it runs high-impact container commands and enables remote model code execution by default without a clear opt-in warning.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · 28 May 2026