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DD clawback

Autonomous state persistence engine that encrypts, secures, and anchors agent memories, state snapshots, and evolved skills onto 0G Storage.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Amir v1.0.0 MIT-0 20 files · 4 scripts body ≈ 875 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Autonomous state persistence engine that encrypts, secures, and anchors agent memories, state snapshots, and evolved skills onto 0G Storage.

As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

ProcedureAI and agentsSoftware developmentSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
72/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
77
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
47/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Secrets in code
If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • high Secrets in code meta-credential-files .env
    Credential / dotenv files bundled with the skill (1)
    .env
Medium and low: 5
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token pnpm-lock.yaml:27
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    resolution: {integrity: sha5…gCD+45y7…bIm+5CLB/vmMaEBbvVWVETcsRhNg==}
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token pnpm-lock.yaml:36
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    resolution: {integrity: sha5…Z4v+DkGoC42/TS2ond+PARCxTJvgTFUNDZovyQ/uAQ4…g7A==}
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token pnpm-lock.yaml:39
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    resolution: {integrity: sha5…6I6+jvuq…Pqq+JZ0T…Rng==}
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token pnpm-lock.yaml:42
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    resolution: {integrity: sha5…GmY+zPPWTC+wQrp…jmH+yCS3…njA==}
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token pnpm-lock.yaml:45
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    resolution: {integrity: sha5…p81+8Ob3…L40/b0i7…gQw==}

Files scanned: 19. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (clawback) differs from the folder (0g-clawback)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Steps. 7 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 875 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • -34 of 4 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 140: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 11 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 7 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill matches its backup-and-restore purpose, but it handles highly sensitive agent state, wallet keys, and encryption keys with unsafe scoping and disclosure.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 16 Sept 2026