DD rmn-soul
(no description)
Not recommendedlow grade D
As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Dangerous commands medium severity
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
If you install
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
For the author
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 9
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 9
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellscripts/anchor.js:128Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed)console.log('\n⚠️ Foundry cast not found. Install: curl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bash && foundryup');code literal -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenREADME.md:98High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)- 合约: ERC-8004 Identity Registry `0x80…432`
quoted -
low Exfiltration
net-credential-usescripts/anchor.js:151Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)`${cast} send --private-key ${privateKey} --rpc-url ${rpcUrl} ${config.identityRegistry} "register(string)" "${agentURI}" --json`,quoted -
low Exfiltration
net-credential-usescripts/anchor.js:199Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)`${cast} send --private-key ${privateKey} --rpc-url ${rpcUrl} ${config.identityRegistry} "setMetadata(uint256,string,bytes)" ${agentId} "${key}" "${val}" --json`,quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenscripts/resurrect.js:48High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)const registry = '0x80…432';
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenscripts/resurrect.js:154High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)reputationRegistry: '0x80…b63',
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenscripts/setup.js:204High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)identityRegistry: '0x80…432',
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenscripts/setup.js:205High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)reputationRegistry: '0x80…b63',
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenSKILL.md:68High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"identityRegistry": "0x80…432",
quoted
Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
frontmatterSKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found - error
name-missingSKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name` - error
description-missingSKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 26 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1002 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -31 of 6 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 12 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
- +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.
External checks
ClawHub: suspicious
This skill matches its advertised memory-and-blockchain purpose, but it handles private agent memory, wallet signing, IPFS publication, and shell commands in ways that need careful review before use.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026