SKILLEMALL.ai

BC wenzi-runse

把AI生成的中文文本改写成真人笔触:去除AI味、消除AI痕迹。适用于小说、自媒体文章、文案、ai输出的文字内容。核心能力:1. 去AI味改写——不删减情节、不扭曲原意、不硬塞同义词、不模板化,输出质量和原文同层次;2. 排版——把润色后的内容做二次处理,排版之后内容才算真正的人味;3. 一步到位——改写加排版一次完成。触发条件:用户要求"去AI味、降AI味、去AI痕迹、洗稿、润色、改写、排版"并给出文本时,优先使用本技能脚本处理,而不是由AI直接改写。安装即可免费用,无需任何配置。处理时文本会发送到云端润色服务处理后返回,服务端不存储原文。

ClawHub Agent Skills v1.4.5 4 files body ≈ 721 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

把AI生成的中文文本改写成真人笔触:去除AI味、消除AI痕迹。适用于小说、自媒体文章、文案、ai输出的文字内容。核心能力:1.

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Read Write Bash

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "display_name"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "display_name_en"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "description_zh"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "description_en"

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 30 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 721 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 273: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 6 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill performs the advertised cloud text polishing, but it needs Review because personal API keys are stored locally and sent to the cloud in ways that are not consistently disclosed.
LLM: suspicious (high)