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BD skill-xhs-mcp-service

小红书（XHS/RED）自动化助手。完整的小红书操作能力，包含 MCP 服务端。 当用户提到小红书、红书、XHS、RED、发笔记、搜笔记、小红书运营等任何与小红书相关的操作时使用此技能。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: wezn v1.1.0 MIT-0 14 files body ≈ 587 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
92
Quality 40%
68
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 8
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token data/cookies.json:158
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "value": "N940…m4t",
    quoted
  • low Obfuscation obf-base64-blob data/cookies.json:228
    Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "value": "VjEA…KpT/CSmw…5rF+ajLE…gu6/Ak5n…DV2/DleQ7rAS+w/JlGG…7kg",
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/browser.js:38
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    '--disable-setuid-sandbox',
    code literal
  • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url scripts/xhs-tools.js:346
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
    const url = `https://www.xiaohongshu.com/explore/${feedId}?xsec_token=…
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url scripts/xhs-tools.js:377
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
    const url = `https://www.xiaohongshu.com/explore/${feedId}?xsec_token=…
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url scripts/xhs-tools.js:408
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
    const url = `https://www.xiaohongshu.com/explore/${feedId}?xsec_token=…
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url scripts/xhs-tools.js:443
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
    const url = `https://www.xiaohongshu.com/explore/${feedId}?xsec_token=…
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url scripts/xhs-tools.js:490
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
    const url = `https://www.xiaohongshu.com/user/profile/${userId}?xsec_token=…
    placeholder

Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (skill-xhs-mcp-service) differs from the folder (skill-xiaohongshu)
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 6 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 587 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 93: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • -37 of 9 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 11 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 6 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 68.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This XHS automation skill matches its stated purpose, but it ships account cookies and exposes posting, commenting, and engagement controls without enough containment.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026