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BD deskuse

Top-level cross-platform computer-use skill that bundles standalone macOS, Windows, and Linux runtimes with zero local Claude dependency and selects the correct platform payload at install/use time.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: wimi321 v0.1.0 MIT-0 80 files body ≈ 607 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 45/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
45/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass SKILL.md:54
      Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
      powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File $HOME/.codex/skills/deskuse/scripts/curr…ps1
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token project/platforms/linux/package-lock.json:80
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…cAz+ivBu…Lvw==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token project/platforms/linux/package-lock.json:114
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…yi2+Iq5p…IcQ/Uiv9…umq/5nqz…9NA==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token project/platforms/linux/package-lock.json:165
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…IxX/wd5n…MGF+pv6g…i2Z+Wnj9/KjGz…4Eg==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token project/platforms/linux/package-lock.json:199
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha512-8mL/vh8q…uJP+ZcVY…AJW+m0Et…WzA==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token project/platforms/linux/package-lock.json:216
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…NES+HiD4…TOe+/2rdn…PWn/r/aAw==",
      detector

    Files scanned: 80. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 45/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 12 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 607 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 198: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 8 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is a real desktop-control tool, but it silently auto-approves powerful app and clipboard permissions, so it should be reviewed before installation.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026