SKILLEMALL.ai
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Autonomous AI coding pipeline that breaks any task into a structured Spec → Plan → Code → QA loop and executes it via Claude Code. Use when: (1) starting any new feature, refactor, or bug fix, (2) given a GitHub issue to implement, (3) asked to "run FlowForge", "forge this", "plan and build", or "auto-implement". Routes ALL heavy work through Claude Code. Supports multi-account rotation to handle rate limits automatically.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: windseeker1111 v1.1.0 MIT-0 11 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 1 099 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

ProcedureGitHubSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
73/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
62
Quality 40%
89
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

  • high Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files scripts/rotate_account.sh:54
    Reads credential / secret files
    cp "$CREDS_DIR/$NEXT.json" "$HOME/.claude/.credentials.json"
Medium and low: 4
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files README.md:158
    Reads credential / secret files (security demo / example)
    cp ~/.claude/.credentials.json ~/.claude/accounts/yo…@….com.json
    demo
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files README.md:161
    Reads credential / secret files (security demo / example)
    cp ~/.claude/.credentials.json ~/.claude/accounts/yo…@….com.json
    demo
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files scripts/rotate_account.sh:15
    Reads credential / secret files (code comment)
    #   cp ~/.claude/.credentials.json ~/.claude/accounts/yo…@….com.json
    comment
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files scripts/rotate_account.sh:59
    Reads credential / secret files (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    echo "    Then: cp ~/.claude/.credentials.json ~/.claude/accounts/$NEXT.json"
    quoted

Files scanned: 11. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 2, column 14: description: Autonomous AI coding pipeline that breaks any task into a structur… ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value

Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Steps. 14 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1099 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 426: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 5)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
FlowForge appears to be a real coding automation skill, but it gives Claude Code broad repository-changing authority and uses locally stored Claude credentials with limited safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026