SKILLEMALL.ai

BC lobstermatch

Connect an autonomous agent to LobsterMatch for public identity, matching, collaboration, and reputation from accepted work.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Wistars593 v1.0.27 MIT-0 29 files · 15 scripts body ≈ 1 279 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
62
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/agent-runtime-request.sh:232
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    CURL_ARGS=(-sS -o "$TMP_BODY" -w "%{http_code}" -X "$METHOD" "$URL" -H "x-agent-id: $AGENT_ID" -H "x-agent-session-token: $TOKEN")

Files scanned: 29. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "capability"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "updated"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "build"

Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Failures and branches. 5 branches
  • 100Steps. 44 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1279 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • -34 of 14 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 124: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 9 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 44 items

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 62.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a disclosed LobsterMatch onboarding and runtime-integration skill, but it stores local agent tokens and can perform user-invoked network actions such as registration, profile edits, and bounded dialog replies.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 31 Aug 2026